COMMENTS
FARMERS AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
Variations in the operation of the federal income tax may result in unequal
tax burdens on different classes of taxpayers. These variations may be explicit
or implicit in the structure of the Internal Revenue Code; they may be glossed
onto the Code structure by the tax administrators; or they may result from
judicial interpretation of a tax law in a manner favorable to a particular group.
The federal ipcome tax system contains countless discriminatory features of
these types, and the consequent burdens or benefits affect a variety of classes
of taxpayers. This comment is confined to a few such facets of the tax structure
which are of importance to farmers' as a taxpaying group.
I
While there is no systematic bias in the Internal Revenue Code favoring
farmers as a taxpaying class, the Code's definition of taxable income clearly
operates to aid the farmer-taxpayei. Although Congress has defined gross income in sweeping terms, 2 the definition is structured around the commercial
transaction, and precludes a tax on imputed income.3 Included within the
category of nontaxable imputed income are the use-value of the taxpayer's
durable personal goods and the value of his self-service. The exclusion of these
items from taxable income is of particular importance to farmers, who are more
self-sustaining than other classes of taxpayers.
Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that:
"Gross income" includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages,
or compensation for personal service... of whatever kind and in whatever form paid,
or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in
property,. . . also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any
business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any
source whatever.
'The Treasury Regulations provide that "[all individuals, partnerships, or corporations
that cultivate, operate, or manage farms for gain or profit, either as owners or tenants, are
designated as farmers. A person cultivating or operating a farm for recreation or pleasure, the
result of which is a continual loss from year to year, is not regarded as a farmer." Treas. Reg.
III § 29.22(a)-7 (1951).
2

Int. Rev. Code § 22(a),'26 U.S.C.A. § 22(a) (1948).

3 "Imputed income" may be distinguished from other income in kind, in that it does not
arise from the ordinary market process. It may be defined "as a flow of satisfactions from durable goods owned and used by the taxpayer, or from goods and services arising out of the personal exertions of the taxpayer on his own behalf." Marsh, The Taxation of Imputed Income,
58 Pol. Sci. Q. 514 (1943).
4Int. Rev. Code § 22(a), 26 U.S.C.A. § 22(a) (1948).
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Although it might have been argued that imputed income is taxable as "income derived from any source whatever," the emphasis which Section 22(a)
places upon the receipt of money or property as a taxable event precluded such
a construction. It should also be noted that other sections of the Code impose a
tax upon annual increases in the value of property only when income has been
realized through a disposition of the property.5 The requirement that such annual gains be "realized" in order to qualify as taxable income is persuasive
evidence that the terms of Section 22(a) do not sanction a tax on any "income"
unless a similar prescribed taxable event, such as the receipt of money or property, has taken place. 6 And since consumption has never been regarded as realization, imputed income could not qualify as taxable income under Section 22(a).

The omission of Congress to upset this settled construction of Section 22(a)
and substitute the proposition that the use of durable consumer property gives
7
rise to taxable income introduces some serious inequities into the tax system.
Critics of the tax immunity now accorded imputed income point to the omission of the rental value of owner-occupied homes from the Code's definition of
income.' Since persons who do not own homes must use taxable funds to pay
rent, home-owners are, in effect, subsidized by the exclusion of the rental value
of their homes from taxable income.
This "subsidy" is accentuated by permitting home-owners to deduct part
of the cost of owning homes from their gross income. Thus, property taxes and
interest charges may be deducted.9 When the optional standard deduction was
sSection iiI of the Code provides that: "(a) ...The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis.
*.. (b) ...The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the
sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other than money)
received." Int. Rev. Code § ii, 26 U.S.C.A. § i1 (1948).
6A constitutional argument against a tax on imputed income probably would not prevail,
although it was thought, at first, that the Sixteenth Amendment required that all taxable
income be realized. The Court in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. I89, 207 (1920), set forth the
requirement that income must be "a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding
fron the property, severed from the capital... and coming in"; see Merchants Loan & Trust
Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921). Later cases indicate, however, that "the rule
[requiring realization of income], founded on administrative convenience, is only one of postponement of the tax to the final event of enjoyment of the income.., and not one of exemption from taxation" Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, xi6 (1940); cf. Helvering v. Griffiths,
318 U.s. 371 (1943)-

7If Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code were redefined to include imputed income,
taxable income would be much closer to the economist's definition of income. Simons, for
example, defines income as the "algebraic sum of (i)the market value of rights exercised in
consumption, and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question." Personal Income Taxation 5o (1938). Haig defines
income as the "money value of the net accretion to one's economic power between two points of
time." The Federal Income Tax 7 (1921). Cf. Magill, Taxable Income 191-97 (1936).
8 See, for example, Marsh, op. cit. supra note 3; Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation 18-35 (1947).

9Int. Rev. Code

§ 23(b),

(c), 26 U.S.C.A. § 23 (b), (c) (1948).
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made part of the Code in 1944,10 this additional home-owner subsidy was

weakened to the extent that a great majority of taxpayers claim a blanket deduction of ten per cent of adjusted gross income (limited to a maximum of
$i,ooo) instead of the normally allowable expense deductions specified in the
Code. If, for example, a taxpayer who rents his home and a taxpayer who
owns his home both claim the optional standard deduction in lieu of deducting
the aggregates of their otherwise allowable expense deductions, the home-owner
will have lost his pre-1944 tax advantage which was due to the deductibility
of property taxes and interest charges under Section 23 of the Code.
However, the more basic discrimination arising from the nontaxability of
the rental value of owner-occupied homes remains in the tax structure; and the
discrimination is of particular importance to farmers as a taxpaying class, for a
higher percentage of farm residences are owner-occupied than are nonfarm
residences.The omission from taxable income of the value of home-produced food consumed by the taxpayer12 is also significant to farmers, who comprise the only
group of taxpayers materially affected by this omission. However, the discrimination resulting from the failure to tax the value of food consumption is
not accentuated by permitting expense deductions, as is the case in the homeowner situation, for the farmer is not permitted to deduct from gross income
the cost of raising food which he consumes. 3 Farmers are required to reduce
yearly expense deductions by an amount equal to the cost of raising food for
each member of the family.'4 The value of the food will generally far exceed
that amount, and this excess is the tax-free benefit.
Although the omission from taxable income of the value of home-produced
food consumed by the taxpayer and the rental value of the taxpayer's home
offers most tax savings per dollar's worth of food and "rent" to farmers in the
upper income brackets, the omission is also important to farmers at the bottom
:0 Int. Rev. Code § 23(aa),

26

U.S.C.A. § 23(aa) (1948).

,The 1940 census reports indicate that 53.4% of farm residences are owned wholly or
partially by their occupants, while 41.1% of nonfarm residences are owner-occupied. The
difference between farm and nonfarm residencesin this respect is diminishing; in i89o, 65.9%
of farm homes were owner-occupied, as compared to 36.9% of nonfarm homes. Bureau of Census (16th Census of U.S.), 2 Housing: General Characteristics (1948).
" "If products of a farm consumed thereon are income to the producer, it would seem to
follow that the rental value of the farmer's home, the gratuitous services of his wife and
children, and the value of the power derived from draft animals owned by the farmer and used
without cost should also be so considered. It is obvious that such items are comparable to
the rental value of a private residence, which has never been regarded as income." Morris v.
Comm'r, 9 B.T.A. 1273, 1278 (1928).
23 1 CCH Fed. Tax Rep. § 61.o 4 (1951); T.D. 2665 (Ig8). The value of produce grown upon
the farm and the value of the farmer's labor cannot be included within expense deductions for
feeding livestock. Treas. Reg. xii, § 29.23(a)-Ii (ig5I).
14 Many rural tax agents require that $55.oo be deducted for each adult member of the
farmer's family, and $35.00 for each child. Morris, Getting the Maximum Tax Savings for Farmers, 69 J. Account. 490, 494 (1950).
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of the income scale, who would otherwise be required to use a large share of
income for purchasing food and housing. Even though this tax immunity aids
less wealthy farmers, however, it should be noted that most nonfarmers in a
comparable financial position must use taxable funds to purchase their food
and housing.
As a result of the omission of a tax on imputed income, all taxpayers enjoy
some amount of tax-free goods and services,' s but the farm group in particular
is in a position to obtain larger amounts of tax-free food and housing than other
groups of taxpayers.' 6
I
When a farmer consumes goods which he has produced, he engages in an
activity which has the same effect upon his economic position as the receipt of
income, for he has "saved" that part of his money income he would otherwise
have had to spend for the goods. And in another sense, farm products bear a
resemblance to other forms of "income," as distinguished from income-producing property, if the farm is thought of as the underlying property which produces such things as crops and livestock. And so the Commissioner has forcefully argued that "[tihe products of a farm are, from the beginning, in the nature of income."7 The argument has cropped up in a variety of situations involving dissimilar tax doctrines," but its implications are perhaps most significant in the area of tax law concerned with attempts to transfer tax incidence
through gifts of income.
In Helvering v. Horst, 9 the taxpayer clipped some negotiable coupons from
his bonds and gave them to his son. The interest paid to the son later that year
when the coupons matured was held to be includible within the income of the
father, and not the son. The Court viewed the assignment of the coupons as a
gift of income, rather than of income-producing property, and since "[t]he
dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of income to those who
earn or otherwise create the right to receive it and enjoy the benefit of it when
paid,""2° the assignment could not operate to transfer tax incidence from father
!sMarsh states that "compared to imputed residential rent, the other items of taxable
imputed income are almost insignificant." Marsh, op. cit. supra note 3, at 523. See also
Vickrey, op. cit. supra note 8, at i8.
16It should also be noted that the availability of tax-free food and housing probably enables many farmers to purchase the services of laborers at lower rates than those which they
would otherwise pay.
17I.T. 391o, 1948-i Cum. Bull. 15.

'1In I.T. 3815, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 3o , for example, the Commissioner argued that farm
products are in the nature of income because he wished to allocate part of the proceeds from
the sale of a citrus grove to the immature fruit, and classify this part of the proceeds as ordinary income, rather than capital gain. See text at note 54 infra.
'9311
20

U.S.

II2 (1940).

Ibid., at i9.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 19

to son. Although a donor of bond coupons does not receive the interest payments, said the Court:
[I-e has nevertheless, by his act, procured payment of the interest as a valuable
gift to a member of his family. Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive
income, to procure a satisfaction which can be obtained only by the expenditure of
money or property, would seem to be the enjoyment of income whether the satisfaction is the purchase of goods at the corner grocery, the payment of his debt there,
or such non-material satisfactions as may result from the 2payment of a campaign
or community chest contribution, or a gift to his favorite son.
1

The Commissioner in1948 used the Horst decision as the basis for two of his
rulings, wherein he decided (i) that a farmer who contributes agricultural products to charitable organizations must include the fair market value of the
products in his gross income for the year of the contribution, 2 and (2) that a
farmer who gives feeder cattle to his son must include the fair market value of
3
the cattle in his gross income for the year in which the gift is made.2
The Commissioner's rulings presupposed that farm products are in the nature of income; that a cow, for example, is more like the coupon on a bond than
it is like the bond itself. Even if it is granted that a cow is properly categorized
as income rather than as income-producing property, however, the Commissioner was applying a rule which was unlike the one prescribed in the Horst
case.
The Commissioner decided that a farmer realizes income at the time he gives
feeder cattle to his son or at the time he contributes crops to charity. In the
Horst case, the Court did not have to decide when the realization of income
took place, for the donor had given the bond coupons to the donee in the same
year as the donee collected the interest. There is some language in the Horst
opinion which lends support to the Commissioner's view; the opinion states, for
example, that "[tihe power to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership
of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment of income to another is
4
the enjoyment, and hence the realization, of income by him who exercises it."'
Elsewhere in the opinion, however, the Court states that:
Ibid., at 117.
- I.T. 391o, 1948-I Cum. Bull.

2

15 .

23I.T. 3932, 1948-2 Cum. Bull. 7. For a critical analysis of these rulings see Miller, Gifts of
Income and of Property: What the Horst Case Decides, 5 Tax L. Rev.x (ig5o). In the case
with which the breeder cattle ruling was concerned, the fair market value of -thecattle at the
time of the gift from father to son was $i5oo. The son later sold the cattle for $21oo. The Commissioner held that the father's basis was o, since he had consistently deducted the cost of
raising the animal. The son's basis, according to the Commissioner, was $r5oo, or the value
of the cattle at the time of the gift. Miller points out that Section 113(a)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides that "If the property was acquired by gift... the basis shall be the
same as it would be in the hands of the donor or the last preceding owner." Accordingly,
Miller contends (viewing this as a gift of property), the donor's basis should be o and the donee's
basis should be $2100.
24Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 18 (1940) (italics added).
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It is the statute which taxes the income to the donor although paid to his donee....
When, by the gift of the coupons, [the donor] has separated his right to interest payments from his investment and procured the payment of the interest to his donee, he has
enjoyed the economic benefits of the income .... 2s
The Commissioner's interpretation of the Horst opinion was rejected by the
6
Tax Court in Farrierv. Comin'r.2
In that case, the taxpayer had given some
heifers and calves to her daughter; the Commissioner insisted that their value
should be taxable to the donor in the year in which the gift was made, even
though the animals had never been sold by the daughter. The Court refused to
extend the Horst case in this manner, stating that "[n]o income is involved.
''
...The income, if there was ever to be any, had to await the sale of the cattle. 27
The court thus not only refused to concede that the giving of an item of income could in itself qualify as a taxable event, but also refused to hold that it
was dealing with a gift whose subject matter was "in the nature of income."
The court felt that the donor "simply made a gift of the property itself."28 The
Farrierdecision therefore indicates not only that the doctrine of the Horst case
is to be kept within carefully proscribed limits insofar as the realization requirement is concerned,29 but also that the Commissioner is going to face rough
judicial battles whenever he contends that "[t]he products of a farm are, from
the beginning, in the nature of income."' °
III
The Internal Revenue Code provides that net income shall be computed
"in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping
the books" of the taxpayer. 3' Such method must, however, "clearly reflect the
2s Ibid., at ii9, 120 (italics added).
27 Ibid., at 284.
26 5 T.C. 277 (95o).
29 Ibid.
29 Cf. Griswold, Charitable Gifts of Income and the Internal Revenue Code, 65 Harv. L.
Rev. 84 (i95i). Griswold argues that the Commissioner reaches a sound result in including
the fair market value of a charitable contribution in the donor's gross income when the contribution is made, since such a course precludes what is, in effect, a "double deduction"a deduction of the cost of producing the thing given, plus a deduction for a charitable contribution under Section 23(0) or 23(q) of the Code. As Griswold demonstrates, however, the
"double deduction" could as easily be prevented by disallowing a charitable contribution
deduction when "the gift is of property which would be included in the taxpayer's inventory
or is otherwise of property the proceeds of which would be fully included in gross income."
Ibid., at 92.
3*I.T. 3910, 1948-I Cum. Bull. 16. If the Commissioner were to shift his argument, conceding that intra-fainily gifts of farm products are gifts of property rather than of income,
he might argue that the rule of Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331r (1940), should be applicable:
that the donor-father, for example, retains "enough" rights in the subject matter of the gift
to the donee-son so that the attempted transfer of tax incidence is ineffective. The Commissioner has been unsuccessful in pursuing this line of argument, however. See Visintainer v.
Comm'r, 187 F. 2d 519 (C.A. roth, r951); Alexander v. Comm'r, '9o F. 2d 753, 755 (C.A. 5th,
ig5i), wherein the court warned that "[tihere is a distinction between managerial control over
income producing property with the consent of the actual owner, and the absolute right of control over both the property and the income derived therefrom.'!
31 Int. Rev. Code § 41, 26 U.S.C.A. §41 (1948).
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income," and within this limitation, all taxpayers are permitted to elect between the cash and accrual methods of determining revenue and expenses during
the tax period.32 However, the Code provides that the Commissioner may require that inventories be considered in computing taxes whenever he decides
that they are necessary "in order clearly to determine the income."z3 The Commissioner has so decided in certain instances, and has provided that:
In order to reflect the net income correctly, inventories at the beginning and end
of each taxable year are necessary in every case in which the production, purchase,
or sale of merchandise is an income-producing factor.34
Where inventories are so required, the Commissioner also requires that the
accrual method of accounting be used, at least with regard to purchases and
sales, and to this extent the accrual method is mandatory for nonfarmers.3s
The purpose of the accrual method is to give a more accurate description of
annual income by a matching of revenue items with appropriate items of expense. The cost of producing revenue during a tax period can thereby be determined with a degree of accuracy which is much higher than that obtained
through the simpler cash method of accounting.
Despite this consideration, the Commissioner has permitted all farmers to
operate on either the cash or accrual (inventory) method.36 In so doing, the
Commissioner has yielded to the bookkeeping practices of the preponderant
majority of farmers. Before the federal Revenue Acts were passed, many farmers kept no books at all; today, most farmers use the cash method of accounting, and over ninety per cent use the cash method for federal income tax
purposes. 37
The Commissioner's Regulations provide that:
A farmer reporting on the basis of receipts and disbursements (in which no inventory to determine profits is used) shall include in his gross income for the taxable
year (I) the amount of cash or the value of merchandise or other property received
during the taxable year from the sale of livestock and produce... (2) the profits
from the sale of livestock or other items which were purchased, and (3) gross income
from all other sources.38
3Int. Rev. Code § 43, 26 U.S.C.A. § 43 (i948).
33 Int. Rev. Code § 22(c), 26 U.S.C.A. § 22(c) (1948).
34 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (c)-I (1951).
35Treas. Reg. iii, § 29.41-2 (1951). Congress was slow in recognizing the utility of the accrual method, and it was only after a long legislative struggle that it became firmly entrenched.

Consult Reimer, Differences in Net Income for Accounting and Federal Income Taxes (1949)
for the legislative history. In approving the use of the accrual method for tax purposes, the
United States Supreme Court stated that it would "enable taxpayers to keep their books and
make their returns according to scientific accounting principles, by charging against income
earned during the tax period, the expenses incurred in and properly attributable to the process
of earning income during that period." United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 440 (1926).
36Treas. Reg. iii, § 29.22(c)-6 (1951).
37 Morris, op. cit. supra note 14; Throckmorton, Federal Taxation of the Farmer, 34 Iowa
L. Rev. 251 (i949).
3sTreas. Reg. iii, § 29.22(a)-7 (195).
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If, however, the farmer elects to report on the accrual method, the Regulations
provide that he must follow the usual methods of accrual accounting.39 The
farmer's accounting formula in that case will parallel the one prescribed for any
manufacturer.
If a farmer produces a crop which takes more than a year from planting to
harvesting, he may, with the consent of the Commissioner, compute his gross
income upon the "crop basis." Under the crop basis, the farmer reports all proceeds from the sale of the crop in the year in which they are realized, but he
40
must also deduct the entire cost of raising the crop in that year.
All farmers may, therefore, elect from among two or three basic accounting
techniques, whereas most nonfarmers who are in the business of selling products
must adhere to one prescribed basic accounting technique. Since the vast majority of farmers use the cash method of accounting, one segment of the taxpaying population is permitted to compute changes in net worth in a cruder
manner than the rest, and in a manner which may lead to tax savings.
A farmer may, by electing to operate on the cash basis, completely disregard
his inventories in computing income. It should be noted, however, that a danger
which would be present in permitting a manufacturer to operate on the cash
basis is absent in the case of the farmer who raises and sells crops. If the manufacturer were permitted to use the cash basis of accounting, he could reduce net
income by using current revenue to purchase additional inventories, and he
could conceivably have no taxable income at all if he were to expand at the
"proper" rate. The farmer who raises and sells crops, on the other hand, cannot
stockpile inventories to any great extent, for he is limited by the perishable nature of his produce. This limiting factor is not operative in the case of the farmer
who owns a dairy or breeding herd, but the Regulations do not permit ranchers
to treat the cost of purchasing additional animals as a current expense deduction. 41Such purchases are categorized as capital investments and will reduce
net income only in the form of increased depreciation deductions. The cash
basis farmer thus cannot reduce current taxable income by expanding his
farming or ranching operation.
The cash method offers more opportunity to shift items of revenue and expense from one tax period to another than does the accrual method. A cash
method taxpayer may postpone recognition of an item of expense by omitting
to make payment until a subsequent tax period, and a tax saving will result if
the expense can be offset against a large revenue item in the later period. The
constructive receipt doctrine, which is now well settled in the tax law, places a
39 Ibid. If a farmer elects to report on the accrual method, "his gross profits are ascertained
by adding to the inventory value of livestock and products on hand at the end of the year the
amount received from the sale of livestock and products.., and deducting from this sum
the inventory value of livestock and products on hand at the beginning of the year and the
cost of livestock and products purchased during the year." Treas. Reg. i 11, § 29.22 (a)-7 (1951 ).
4o Ibid.

41Treas.

Reg. iii, § 29.23(a)-ii (195i).
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limit on the ability to postpone receipt of revenue items, however.42 Apart from
this incentive to offset revenue against expense, the progressive nature of the
income tax may make it desirable to level income by recognizing an item of
revenue in a period other than that in which the taxpayer has an unconditional
right to receive it, or by recognizing an item of expense in a period other than
that in which the taxpayer incurs an obligation to pay. And the cash method
taxpayer has more opportunity to level his income than does the accrual method
taxpayer.
Of course, the farmer may in certain years pay a higher tax because he has
elected to operate on the cash method. Losses or gains will vary with changing
harvests, prices and tax rates; but over a long period of time, the cash method
is certain to offer more flexibility than the accrual method. Although the farmer
is not permitted to change his accounting method without the consent of the
Commissioner, he does have the initial opportunity of selecting the basic accounting technique that is best suited for his particular enterprise,43 and he
does have more of a chance to shift items of revenue and expense than does the
accrual method taxpayer. To this extent, the Internal Revenue Code and the
Commissioner's Regulations have provided the farm group, along with other
groups of taxpayers who have developed specialized approved accounting
formulae, with avenues for possible tax savings.
IV
Section 17(j) of the Internal Revenue Code 44 provides that gains from the
sale or exchange of certain real or depreciable property, held for longer than six
months, and used in the trade or business, may be treated as capital gains. In
order to come within the scope of the Section, the property must not be "of a
kind which would properly be includible in the inventory of the taxpayer if on
hand at the end of the taxable year," and must not be "held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."
At the end of each tax period, the taxpayer is permitted to balance his "Section 117(j) gains" with his "117(j) losses." If the gains exceed the losses, the

excess is treated as a net long-term capital gain; but if the gains do not exceed
the losses, neither gains nor losses are accorded capital asset treatment. Thus,
4In Hineman v. Brodrick, 99 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Kans., ig5r), for example, a grain elevator association postponed payment for wheat shipments at the farmer's request. Since it
was customary to pay for the wheat upon delivery, the court held that the farmer-taxpayer
was in constructive receipt of the purchase price and had realized income in the year of delivery.
43For a discussion of some of the situations in which the liberty of choosing an accounting
technique results in tax savings for farmers, see Morris, op. cit. supra note 14; Throckmorton,
op. cit. supra note 37; Foster, Farm Income Tax Problems, 36 Ill. Bar. J. 312 (W48);Keaton,
Practical Farm Tax Problems, 22 Ind. L.J. Ii (X947).
441nt. Rev. Code § 117(J), 26 U.S.C.A. § I7(j) (i945). The Section has an interesting and
complicated history. Consult Brookes, The Expanding and Potential Scope of Section 7(j),
Proceedings of the U.S.C. School of Law Tax Institute 299 (I95o). Efforts to repeal the Section
in 1951 were unsuccessful.
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the Section never imposes upon the taxpayer the risk of paying a larger tax than
he would have paid in the absence of the Section. And although the Section prescribes a system of balancing gains against losses, the taxpayer may, by postponing 117(j) losses to another period, manage to get capital gains treatment
for all 117(j) gains during the current period. The postponed 17(j) losses will,
in turn, be treated as ordinary losses if there are no offsetting gains during the
later tax period. 4S Similar tax savings may, of course, be obtained by recognizing
I 17(6) losses in the current period, and postponing ii 7(j) gains to a later period.
It is clear that Section ii7(j) was not meant to apply to sales of stock in
trade, or to normal, recurring business transactions; it was meant to lessen the
burden which would be incurred if a normal tax were placed upon gains from
abnormal business transactions.46 The first comment on the measure by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue concerned itself with the applicability of
the Section to sales of livestock.47 The Commissioner ruled that livestock
which were purchased for draft, breeding, or dairy purposes, and not primarily for sale, comprised property whose eventual sale might bring it under
Section 117(j). The Commissioner then stated that "[t]he sale of animals culled
from the breeding herd as feeder or slaughter animals in the regular course of
business is not to be treated as the sale of a capital asset."4 So the benefits of
the Section were not to be accorded "culls"-the undesirable animals that
farmers remove from dairy and breeding herds and sell each year.
The Commissioner realized the impracticality of accurately recording the
sales of all such culls from large herds, and in a later ruling49 provided a prima
facie test, which stated that the farmer could not receive capital gains treatment for sales of culls if he maintained his herd at the same size; if, however,
he decreased his herd by selling culls, the sales would be treated as dispositions
of capital assets. This ruling thus precluded a lower tax on recurrent transactions which did not operate to reduce the size of the taxpayer's business
property.
The Commissioner's rulings were contested and overruled in Albright v.
United States.so Albright had sold some culls from his breeding herd, and re4S If, for example, a taxpayer has a 1170) loss of $iooooin 195o and a 1176) gain of $io,ooo
in 195o, the two will offset each other and result in neither a net gain or loss. If the taxpayer
postpones his 1170) gain to x951, however, his 1950 1176) loss will be treated as an "ordinary
loss," and will be fully deductible. His 1951z 17(j) gain will be taxed at capital gains rates. The
net result of postponing his 117(j) gain is a tax saving of $5,ooo.
46It has been said that the purpose of a lower tax on capital gains "is to alleviate the burden
which would be incurred by the taxpayer should that gain be classified as ordinary income over
a short period when, in fact, it had accrued over a long period of investment." Boomhower v.
Comm'r, 74 F. Supp. 997, iooi (N.D., Iowa, i947). Consult Miller, The "Capital Asset"
Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation, 59 Yale L.J. 837, 1057 (195o).

47 I.T. 3666, 1944 Cum. Bull.
48 Ibid., at 272.
49

270.

I.T. 3712, 1945 Cum. Bull. 176.

so 173 F. 2d 339 (C.A. 8th, 1949).
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placed them with healthier animals he had raised.5s The Commissioner decided
that the proceeds of the sale were fully taxable as ordinary income; but Albright
contended that under Section 117(J) the proceeds constituted a capital gain.
The court found for Albright, holding that all the requirements of Section 117(J)
had been met.5 2 The Commissioner had based his opposition to the taxpayer on
the argument that the livestock were held by the taxpayer "primarily for sale."
The court looked to the intent of the taxpayer in acquiring the livestock, and
found that he was in the business of maintaining a breeding herd, rather than
selling nonbreeding livestock. Although the taxpayer knew that some of the
livestock would recurrently be sold, his primary purpose was to use the animals
for breeding purposes, and so he brought himself within the language of Section 117(j).
The Albright rules3 accorded capital gains treatment to transactions which as
a class are recurrent and expected. The farmer usually sells culls from his breeding or dairy herd every year-and his tax is considerably lowered every yearbecause such sales come under Section 117(j). But customary transactions of this sort, yielding fixed returns, are not usually accorded
capital gains treatment. A great deal of difficulty in the Albright situation arises because of the dual nature of the property involved. While
the property is held by the taxpayer it is used in his business and is not
"held for sale," but when its period of usefulness has expired, it clearly is "held
for sale," and this was understood from the moment of acquisition. It might
have been proper, for the purposes of Section 117(j), to have recognized that a
certain part of each herd of breeder cattle is intended to be sold to customers
regularly after a fixed holding period, even though this part of the herd may be
used as business property during the holding period. By not making such a distinction, the courts have extended to many farmers a sizeable tax advantage not
normally open to other classes of taxpayers.
Section I17 (j) has been held to be applicable to another class of farm transactions involving gains which bear some resemblance to ordinary income. Owners
of citrus groves often sell their entire holdings, including the immature fruit on
s$Albright's herd of breeding hogs was also in issue in the case. Each year he sold his entire herd of breeding hogs, as is customary in the hog-raising business, and replaced them with a
new herd of young hogs. It was held that such sales come within the scope of Section 17(j).
52 Since Albright used the cash method of accounting, the Commissioner did not contend
that the livestock were "properly includible" in the farmer's inventory. In Fawn Lake Ranch
Co., 12 T.C. 1139 (1949), wherein the taxpayer involved used the accrual method and inventoried its cattle, the court decided that the inventorying was a "convenience of accounting,"
and held that the proceeds from the sale of inventoried cattle came within the scope of Section
117(j). The dissenting judge stated that "I am unable to conclude that Congress did not legislate with regard to existing and established methods of accounting in the various forms of
enterprise and that it did not intend to exclude, as property 'used in the trade or business,'
the breeding herd of a ranching operation." Ibid., at 1146.
53 For some examples of the application of the Albright rule, see Miller v. United States,
98 F. Supp. 948 (D.C. Neb., igsi); Davis v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 785 (D.C. Iowa, x95i);
Bennett v. United States, 89 F. Supp. io6 (D.C. Tea., ig5o); Isaac Emerson v. Comm'r, x2
T.C. 875 (1949).
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the trees. The Commissioner has contended that the fruits are held primarily
for sale to customers, and "regardless of the stage of their development," the
part of the gain from the sale of the entire grove allocable to the fruit should be
treated as ordinary income54
The Commissioner's allocation formula was rejected by a District Court in
Irrgangv. Fahs,ss the court holding that since the taxpayer "sold herself out of
business for a lump sum consideration," and since she was in the business of
selling "mature fruit as a product separate from the grove," the entire gain on
the sale would be accorded the benefit of Section 1 7 (j). A different result was
later reached by the Tax Court in Watson v. Comm'r.- 6 In this case too, the taxpayer argued that a sale of immature fruit should not give rise to ordinary income because she was "in the business of producing and selling ripe oranges and
not in the business of producing and selling green oranges." In holding for the
Commissioner, the court answered:
[T]he primary purpose and objective of the farmer or fruit grower is the sale of his
crop to some customer or customers... we are unable to see how the holding of the
oranges primarily for sale to customers is changed to a holding primarily for some
other purpose because the grower manages to realize his purpose to sell.., before
the oranges are mature, or because as a part of the same transaction the land was also
sold.s7
In the Revenue Act of 1951, all the farmer's judicial contests under Section
117 (j) were finally resolved in his favor. First, the Albright rule was written into
the Code. Section 1x 7 (j) was amended to apply to sales of "livestock, regardless
of age, held by the taxpayer for draft, breeding, or dairy purposes, and held by
him for twelve months or more from the date of acquisition." s8 Sales of poultry,
for some unexpressed reason, are specifically excluded from the coverage of the
Section. Second, Section ii 7 (j) was amended to insure that the gain from the
sale of a farm or grove allocable to immature crops or fruit be accorded capital
gains treatment. The new subsection of II 7 (j) provides that:
In the case of an unharvested crop on land used in the trade or business and held
for more than 6 months, if the crop and the land are sold or exchanged... at the
same time and to the same person, the crop shall be considered as "property used in the
trade or business."'S9
54

I.T. 3815, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 30.

ss94 F. Supp.

206 (S.D. Fla., ig5o). Accord: Cole v. Smyth, 96 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Calif.,
'95').
56iS T.C. 8oo (i95o). See also McCoy v. Comm'r, iS T.C. 828 (195o).

57 Watson v. Comm'r, iS T.C. 8oo, 824 (i95o).
5s Int. Rev. § Ir7(j), 26 U.S.C.A. § 17(j) (Cum. Supp., 1951). In x95i, before the Congressional action, the Commissioner partially acquiesced to the Albright rule, and agreed

that animals culled from the dairy and breeding herds would be considered property "used in
the trade or business," and within the scope of Section 1170), provided that the animals were
held for their "full period of usefulness," and that they were sold as a "consistent practice"
by the taxpayer. Income Tax Information Release No. 3 (April 18, 95i).
s9Int. Rev. Code § ri(j)(3 ), 26 U.S.C.A. § 117(J)(3) (Cum. Supp., 195i). Section 24(f)
was also added to the Internal Revenue Code in i95i. It provides that: "Where an unharvested
crop sold by the taxpayer is considered under the provisions of Section II 7(j)( 3 ) as 'property
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The farmer now has legislative assurance that the generous provisions of Section 117(j) will be applied to two broad classes of farm transactions.
Some of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, some of the Commissioner's Regulations, and some court decisions have, at one time or another,
served to benefit farmers as a taxpaying class. The same or similar Code provisions, Regulations, and court decisions have undoubtedly benefited many
other classes of taxpayers in a like fashion. An appraisal of the economic consequences of this variety of benefits in the tax system would be difficult, if not
impossible; and perhaps the very difficulty of such an appraisal is a forceful
argument against Code provisions, Regulations, and court decisions which accord special treatment to a chosen class of taxpayers.

LIVING EXPENSES WHILE "AWAY FROM
HOME": BUSINESS OR PERSONAL?
Section 23 (a) (i) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code' provides that when an
expenditure is incurred in the pursuit of a business venture, as distinguished
from personal gratification, it is deductible from gross income.2 Before 1921 it
was held by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the courts that although
transportation expenses incurred on business trips were deductible, expenditures made for meals and lodgings during such trips were not. 3 In i92o a regulation of the Bureau made deductible expenses for meals and lodging in excess of
what the taxpayer would ordinarily pay for these personal needs when at his
established residence.4 In 1921 an amendment to a statute comparable to
Section 23 (a) (i) (A) explicitly provided for the deduction of meals and lodging
expenses by enlarging the business expense category so as to encompass all
"traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodgused in the trade or business,' in computing net income no deduction... attributable to the
production of such crop shall be allowed." For a survey of the problems which may arise
under §§ 117(J)(3) and 24(f), see Halstead, Capital Gains of Farmers, 25 So. Calif. L. Rev.
36, 47 et seq. (ig5i).
S26 U.S.C.A. § 23 (a)(i)(A) (1948).

'The section provides that in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
"All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business.. . ." Ibid. In contrast, Section 24 (a)(1) states that no deduction
shall be allowed for "[p]ersonal, living or family expenses .... " Int. Rev. Code § 24 (a)(i),
26

U.S.C.A. § 24 (a)(i) (1948).
3 Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 392 (1920).
4T.D. No. 3101, 3 Cum. Bull. i9

(1920)

(1920). This ruling amended Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 293
which had stated that expenses for meals and lodging on business trips were not fully

deductible. Accord: io B.T.A. 386, 389 (1928); Mim. 2688, 4 Cum. Bull. 209 (1921). A person
claiming a traveling expense deduction was required to attach to his return a statement setting

forth the cost of personal expenses had he lived at his residence. All business traveling expenses
in excess of that amount were deductible.

